We feature each week Nicholas Reid's reviews and comments on new and recent books
“THE MAKING OF
NEW ZEALANDERS” by Ron Palenski (Auckland University Press, $NZ45)
“At what point in the nineteenth century did
transplanted English, Scots and Irish, or people from anywhere else, make the
mental leap to considering themselves New Zealanders?”
This
question is asked in the opening pages of Ron Palenski’s introduction to The Making of New Zealanders. It is the
key question that motivated his research. Palenski, noted sports journalist and
author of numerous books about New Zealand sporting achievements, undertook The Making of New Zealanders as his
doctoral thesis in History at the University of Otago. It is a weighty,
well-documented 382-page tome (312 pages of text; 70 pages of notes, bibliography
and index).
In
answering his own question, Palenski immediately suggests what he is up
against. He is taking on Keith Sinclair’s 1986 book about early Pakeha national
feeling A Destiny Apart. Pakeha
consciousness of a distinct national identity, argues Palenski, was being
forged progressively in the late 19th century. Pace Sinclair, it did not come into existence with the Boer War or
the 1905 New Zealand rugby tour of Britain or the Gallipoli campaign. Indeed
the fact that these things were
seen as nation-defining events was the result,
rather than the creation, of national
feeling. The emergence of a sense of national identity among Pakeha was a
gradual, decades-long, late nineteenth century process.
Chapter
by chapter, Palenski sets out to prove this thesis.
In
the first, he details the binding effect of communication in early New Zealand.
The telegraph, then the creation of New Zealand Mean Time in 1868, then the
expansion of railways and the establishment of the Union Steamship Company, all
meant that New Zealand, being settled in an age of advanced technology, rapidly
developed the sense of being one unified community. The country soon by-passed
the stage of meaningful provincialism.
Then
(Chapter 2) there was the press. At first, says Palenski, New Zealand
newspapers were very local and overtly political sheets. He details the early,
pre-cable, practice of rival rags vying for priority in reporting overseas
news, by raiding overseas ships for their overseas newspapers as soon as they
arrived in port. But greater uniformity of news (and hence a more emphatic
shared national identity) came with the formation of a New Zealand Press
Association. Further, as Palenski notes only briefly, newspapers provided the
foundation for a real indigenous literature as they were the only places where
New Zealand poets and short story writers were regularly published.
It
was also (Chapter 3) through the press that national symbols and phrases were
popularised and disseminated. Palenski says that the phrase “God’s Own Country”
[whence “Godzone”] was a common New Zealand usage before Thomas Bracken
included it in a poem and Richard Seddon took it up. Bracken’s national hymn
“God Defend New Zealand” was set to music and already widely sung after its
first performance in 1876. (At which point one critic – accurately, in my view
– described it as “a dreary dirge for a
national song.”) A distinctive New Zealand flag and distinctive New Zealand
postage stamps were introduced and distinctive New Zealand flora and fauna were
taken up as trade-marks and images by advertisers, publishers and boosters of
New Zealand tourism.
Thus
far, thus incontestable. Palenski, in his first three chapters, sets out
material evidence for distinct markers of New Zealand identity before the end
of the nineteenth century. But this is not the same as proving a consciousness
of being a New Zealander as opposed to being primarily a transplanted Briton.
In some of what follows the argument becomes more contestable.
When
he opens his fourth chapter, “Was New Zealand Exceptional?”, Pakenski contends
overtly with the historian Miles Fairburn’s thesis that New Zealand was not
exceptional in its development when compared with other settler colonies in the
19th century. Au contraire,
says Palenski, much of New Zealand’s polity was unique to New Zealand. He
argues for New Zealand exceptionalism with reference to the Treaty of Waitangi;
the relationship (more accommodating than in other British colonies) with the
indigenous people, especially after wars of the 1860s and with the fact of
Maori representation in parliament; the abolition of a federal (provincial)
system, unlike federal Australia, Canada and South Africa; the standardising of
national education with the 1877 Education Act; and the distinction of early
women’s suffrage. In turn this leads him to consider New Zealand’s Liberal-era
reputation as the “social laboratory of the world” and the familiar list of
distinguished visitors who praised New Zealand in these terms. Consequently, he
argues in Chapter 5, it was not only geographical location and the 1200 miles
of the Tasman Sea that led New Zealand to reject federation with Australia when
it was offered. By the time the offer was made, New Zealanders already knew
they were a nation apart.
Palenski
then proceeds to deal with the event that Keith Sinclair saw as inaugurating
Kiwi national consciousness – participation in the Boer War. For Palenski it is
the “forgotten war”, never properly covered by New Zealand historians, and he
emphasises the degree to which New Zealand involvement was on New Zealand’s
terms, and was an offshoot of existing national consciousness. Referring to
Maori involved in combat duties, he once again notes New Zealand’s
distinctiveness in this area:
“Maori, as in so many aspects of New Zealand
life, provided a significant point of difference from both Britain and the
other settler colonies in the Boer War and an appreciation of this factor is
critical to the belief that the war consolidated rather than created a national
identity. While other settler colonies subjugated or tried to ignore their
indigenous populations, encouraged by the belief in white Anglo-Saxon
superiority, New Zealand’s was absorbed and embraced.” (Pg.204)
In
his last two chapters, Palenski enters the territory with which he is most
often identified. Chapter 7 is the sport chapter, with Palenski arguing that
inherited British games were approached in a distinctively New Zealand way. He
makes the case for greater New Zealand egalitarianism in sportsmanship, noting
among much else the absence of guides and porters in such endeavours as
mountain-climbing. Finally Chapter 8 is the rugby chapter. Rugby, says
Palenski, was already firmly and distinctively embedded in the New Zealand
psyche before the almost-invincible New Zealand side toured Britain in 1905. He
spends much time refuting (successfully) the myth that the name “All Blacks”
was invented in England during the 1905 tour. It was already in common use in
the 1890s. This he takes as an example of game’s adoption and acclimatisation
to New Zealand.
And
here, before a final recapitulation, his argument ends.
You
will note that in typically poker-faced fashion. I have simply summarised
Palenski’s book before making any critical comments, as I do want to make it
clear that it covers much ground, is extensively researched and is full of
interest.
I
sympathise with Palenski when I detect an undercurrent of impatience with
postmodernist theory. I mentally applaud when he rejects a “Said-like standpoint” and the term “cultural appropriation” in discussing
the way 19th century Pakeha entrepreneurs used Maori motifs in their
advertising and trade-marks (pp.108-109)
At
the same time, I do have to take issue with elements of the style. I assume the
original academic thesis was adapted for publication. But some parts seem
insufficiently purged of the academic style. For example Chapter 5, on possible
federation, begins with what looks like a “literature review” of what has been
written on this topic. It takes too long considering how Australia got
federated before it swings back to the supposedly focal issue of New Zealand. Chapter
2 becomes a list of the names of writers and newspapers without really
evaluating the national spirit that Palenski says they expressed.
More
important than matters of style, however, there is much that I take issue with
in the overall argument.
I
am surprised that Palenski makes so little use of nineteenth century
demographics. Had he done so, he would have found that the proportion of Scots
and Irish in New Zealand was far higher than the proportion of those
ethnicities (vis-à-vis the English) in Britain itself. In effect, he would have
found that if ever New Zealand was a “South Britain”, it was racially a very
different Britain than the original one. [Even leaving aside the whole question
of the indigenous Maori]. And this could have powerfully reinforced his
argument for a distinctive nineteenth century New Zealand Pakeha identity.
On
the other hand, he would, in considering the New Zealand Scots and Irish, have
found how much recent historians (see Brad Patterson; see Lydon Fraser et al)
have emphasised their retention of a distinct ethnic identity, set apart from
what they saw as the Anglo stream. Yea verily, even unto the second generation,
New Zealand Scots and Irish still saw themselves primarily as transplanted
Scots and Irish. Too often, Palenski assumes that there was one standard norm
of Pakeha and ignores this major factor of Pakeha ethnic and cultural (and religious)
diversity. Did Dunedin Scots Presbyterians have the same national consciousness
as Southland Irish Catholics or Canterbury English Anglicans?
More
generally, I think that Palenski is too certain he has proven that there was a
“finished” national consciousness in the late nineteenth when it was (and still
is, and ever will be in such an immigrant nation) an ill-defined consciousness
very much in the making. Well into the 20th century, there were
still New Zealand-born people who referred to Britain as “Home” and even now,
with a British monarch as head of state, the project of forging a distinct
national identity is incomplete. Too often, Palenski turns aside from, or
glides swiftly over, clear evidence that Pakeha in the late nineteenth century
saw themselves as transplanted Britons first.
Yes,
New Zealand adopted a distinctive flag (Chapter 3). But surely - as Palenski fails to note - a flag
incorporating the Union Jack is still a flag proclaiming dependence on British
authority. Yes, New Zealand may have been the “social laboratory of the world”
(Chapter 4) but even Palenski has to note that our social legislation wasn’t as
distinctive as all that. Much of it derived from Australian models and the very
fact that New Zealand took such pride in foreign approval shows how much Pakeha
were unsure of their own status. They still required reassurance from others
that they were doing the right thing. Yes, Palenski may be right in his
contention that “war is one way in which
national identity is put on display to the rest of the world”. But the
chapter on the Boer War really tells me that New Zealand still wanted (and got)
a pat on the head from the imperial power for its participation - just as it
did at Gallipoli. If this is national consciousness, it is the national
consciousness of a dependent child. When he speaks of rugby and other sports,
Palenski does (to be fair) note the irony of a national identity being built on
English “public” school games. But he passes quickly over the implications this
has for a continuing dual identity –
at least as much British as New Zealand. Likewise, he does mention, but rushes
past, Jamie Belich’s “recolonisation” thesis – which says that in many respects
New Zealand’s growing sense of nationhood was retarded by the greater economic
dependence on Britain which began with refrigeration and the export of meat and
dairy products.
None
of this is to deny the real and demonstrable evidence for New Zealand national
consciousness that Palenski presents. It is simply to suggest that much of it
can be contextualised differently. For every “proof” of Kiwi consciousness in
the late nineteenth century, one could find in the record an equal “proof” of
persistent identification with Britain among Kiwis. To get all rhetorical, I want
to ask if New Zealanders were “made” in the late nineteenth century – as in the
title The Making of New Zealanders
- then why were our writers and
poets in the 1930s so aggressive about (as they saw it) for the first time
creating a truly national literature? How come Michael Joseph Savage could
still say in 1939 “Where Britain goes we go”? Why was Bill
Pearson still having anxious hysterics about the nature of New Zealanders in
his 1951 essay Fretful Sleepers? Why
wasn’t New Zealand history taught in our universities until the 1960s and why
did Keith Sinclair and W.H.Oliver, in the late 1950s, see themselves as having
to present the case for writing nationalist history at all? There was, well
past the middle of the twentieth century, much uncertainty about what is meant
to be a New Zealander anyway.
Etcetera.
Etcetera.
My
point is that national identity is a fluid thing and you really can’t fix down
one time (late nineteenth century or much later) when most New Zealanders were
comfortable with being New Zealanders. Palenski’s thesis is only as valid as
the Sinclair one that it specifically contests. Perhaps it would be better
re-titled The Beginning of the
Making of New Zealanders.
I
do not want to finish on this sour note, however, as I have to acknowledge that
this book is filled with interesting insights and with factual information of
which I had hitherto been ignorant. To give some examples, I wasn’t aware that
different parts of New Zealand operated in different time zones until 1868, or
that telephones were being used in New Zealand within three years of Alexander
Graham Bell’s taking out his patents in 1876 (Chapter 1).Nor did I know that
British coinage remained New Zealand’s legal tender until the 1930s (Chapter
3). It was a shock to discover how close New Zealand came to being another
convict colony like New South Wales (Chapter 4).On the other hand, it was
heartening to find that at least one reason for rejecting federation with
Australia was a fear that Maori would be disenfranchised in a Greater Australia
(Chapter 5).
I
may disagree with the overall argument of this thesis, but it is a solid work
of scholarship and a big contribution to a debate on national consciousness
that is far from closed.
Interesting but otherwise irrelevant footnote – Palenski’s Introduction gives a clear
account of Lord Macaulay’s famous image of a future “visitor from New Zealand”
sketching the ruins of London from the broken arch of London Bridge. As
Palenski rightly notes, it became a cliché for English editorialists in the
nineteenth century to quote it whenever New Zealand was mentioned. In Ian St
George’s edition of William Colenso’s letters-to-the-press Give Your Thoughts Life [look it up on the blog index at right],
there is reproduced a letter Colenso wrote in March 1864 (pp.175-176) in which
he points out that Macaulay probably unconsciously plagiarised the idea of a
“traveller from New Zealand” gazing on the remnants of London or Paris from a
French book, the preface to an account of La Billardiere’s voyage in search of
the missing explorer La Perouse. These perfidious Albionites are always nicking
good ideas from the French! (Just compare the original Eiffel Tower with the
Blackpool Tower, mon ami.)
The Oxford historian Robert Service asserts that a sense of nationalism stems from three things: territory, custom and traditions. Palenski's thesis has, in my view, missed the mark on all three.
ReplyDeleteDr Neil Clayton
History New Zealand
You may be right, Neil, but my own view is something like that of Chou En-Lai (I think) when he was asked if he could explain the real outcome of the French Revolution; "It's too soon to tell." I think national feeling and nationalism in New Zealand are still too provisional to be discussed as things other than potential.
ReplyDelete