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Monday, April 20, 2015

Something Old


Not everything worth reading is hot off the press. In this section, we recommend "something old" that is still well worth reading. "Something old" can mean anything from a venerable and antique classic to a good book first published four or more years ago. 

 “BLASTING AND BOMBARDIERING” by Wyndham Lewis (first published 1937; posthumously revised edition 1967)

Only once before on this blog have I given an account of a work by Percy Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957), the early 20th century Modernist who is now largely a back number and is no longer read in the way his fellow Modernists Pound and Eliot and Joyce still are. The book I then covered was Lewis’ overlong and ultimately tiresome attempt to skewer London’s art and literary scene in the 1920s The Apes of God [look it up on the index at right]. In the course of that review I noted that Lewis’ novels tend to be tedious pieces of attitudinising, but that he was genuinely a very good artist, one of the best that English Modernism threw up, especially in his portraits and First World War landscapes. I also noted flippantly that “his name-dropping memoirs Blasting and Bombardiering are still readable.”
Indeed they are, which is why I am now dealing with them. That, plus the fact that we are still commemorating the centenary of the First World War and parts of this
strangely-constructed and digression-filled book are a very interesting war memoir.
Wyndham Lewis (who hated his first name Percy and resented it when people addressed him by it) wrote his eccentric and idiosyncratic memoirs in the mid-1930s.  Blasting and Bombardiering confines itself to the twelve years between 1914, the outbreak of the First World War, and 1926, the failed General Strike in Britain, taking Lewis from the age of 32 to the age of 44. Lewis repeatedly tells us that he brackets these twelve years together because they represent the war and the “post-war”. Frequently he uses the term “post-war” to represent not only the unsettled state of affairs after the ’14-’18 war, but also to designate a set of values which he rejects. Lewis’ view is that after 1926, the “post-war” ended, attitudes in Britain changed radically, the Slump meant a different sort of art was produced, and there was also an awareness that another major war was an inevitability. Writing in 1937, Lewis takes it for granted that in a few years Europe will once again be at war.
Putting together from various parts of this book what Lewis’ judgement on the First World War was, I come up with the following. First, he sees the war as having little real cause and as having settled nothing:
The War went on for far too long, or too long for a ‘totalitarian’ war, as it would now be called. It was too vast for its meaning, like a giant with the brain of a midge. Its epic proportions were grotesquely out of scale, seeing what it was fought to settle. It was far too indecisive. It settled nothing, as it meant nothing. Indeed, it was impossible to escape the feeling that it was not meant to settle anything – that could have any meaning, or be of any advantage, to the general run of men.”  (Part Four, Chapter One)
Second, claiming the authority to speak as an ex-combatant, he distances himself from pacifists, whom on the whole he regards with contempt, and suggests that he is morally neutral about war. But nevertheless he sees the war as having been started by foolish people as part of the inevitable foolishness in which humanity is involved:
My attitude to War is complex. Per se, I neither hate nor love it. War I only came to know gradually, it is true. War takes some getting to know. I know it intimately. And what’s more, I know all about War’s gestation and antecedents, and I have savoured its aftermaths. What I don’t know about War is not worth knowing. When first I met War face to face I brought no moral judgements with me at all. I have never been able to regard war – modern war – as good or bad. Only supremely stupid. Certainly I understand that almost all wars are promoted and directed by knaves, for their own unpleasant ends, at the expense of fools, their cannonfodder. And certainly knaves are bad men, very bad men. But the greatest wickedness of all – if we deal much in moral values – is the perpetuation of foolishness which these carnivals of mass-murder involve.” (Part Two, Chapter Five)
Third, he describes the peace treaties at the end of the war as having destroyed a valid form of power structure in Europe and having put in its place shaky mob rule, for which he uses the term “democracy”. Here is Lewis suggesting what he couldn’t foresee when he was actually fighting in the War:
  The insane attempt to stultify and hamstring forever all that was robust, industrious, intelligent, in Europe, and put in the place of the real the unreal. These barbarous triumphs of ‘democracy’ I should have been a seer indeed to imagine. In short, had I been able to see Armageddon Number One, I could at least not have seen Armageddon Number Two, which is now bearing down on us; a coming home to roost of all the Peace Treaties”. (Part One, Chapter Six)
And finally there is his sense of social and moral exhaustion at the end of the war – the exhaustion which he calls the “post-war” and which justifies the way he has organised his book:
 The War bled the world white. It had to recover. While it was in the exhausted state a sort of weed-world sprang up and flourished. All that was real was in eclipse, so all that was unreal came into its own and ran riot for a season. But now the real is recovering its strength. Beneath the pressure of this convalescent reality our cardboard make-believe is beginning to crack and to tumble down.” (Introduction)
As you can deduce from all this, Wyndham Lewis liked to think of himself as part of an intellectual elite, was a great egotist, and tended to limit his sympathy for most human beings to pity at their gullibility. Lurking behind all the above statements on the war is his sense that most people deserve to be ruled by those who are stronger and more capable than they are. We remember that he had at least a flirtation with Fascism, though by the time he wrote Blasting and Bombardiering he was diplomatically backing away from it. In the chapter “Death to Mussolini” (Part Four, Chapter Four) he claims rather disingenuously to be totally apolitical and to have had no inkling of what was going on in Italy when he visited there in the early 1920s. (More interestingly, Lewis wrote a pamphlet before Hitler came to power, hailing Hitler as a force for order; but later on changed his mind and – before the Second World War – wrote a pamphlet, which was praised by the Jewish press, condemning Hitler’s anti-semitism.)
Having presented you with this summary of Lewis’ political views, I should also note the other aspects of this book that will probably offend your sensibilities. Lewis makes the occasional sardonic and dismissive comment on the Spanish Civil War, which was in progress when Blasting and Bombardiering was being written. Lewis occasionally pokes fun at homosexuals, though never specifically identifying them as such. (Typical of his technique is the comment that “herds of lipsticked Nancyish nobodies” holiday in Venice, Part Four, Chapter Four). And – in my opinion with fairly good reason - Lewis hates with a passion those moneyed and patrician individuals known as the Bloomsbury Group. At one point he calls them “sheep in Woolf’s clothing” and he sniggers at their behaviour during the First World War thus:
The ‘Bloomsburies’ were all doing war-work of ‘National importance’, down in some downy English county, under the wings of powerful pacifist friends; pruning trees, planting gooseberry bushes, and haymaking, doubtless in large sunbonnets. One at least of them, I will not name him, was disgustingly robust. All were of military age. All would have looked well in uniform…. The ‘Bloomsburies’ all exempted themselves, in one way or another. Yet they had money and we hadn’t; ultimately it was to keep them fat and prosperous – or thin and prosperous, which is even worse – that other people were to risk their skins for.” (Part Three, Chapter Twelve)
Now having thoroughly oriented you to when this book was written, and the essential world-view of the man who wrote it, let me explain why I think it is more than an historical curiosity and still worth reading. More than anything, and opinionated and egotistical though it may be, it is an interesting gossipy account of Britain’s artistic circles just before and after the First World War, and of one man’s experience during the war.
Lewis begins (Part One, Chapter One) with an anecdote about being a battery commander taking parade ground drill and an adjutant interrupting him to ask him a question about Futurism. At once he situates himself as both an artist and a soldier. He proceeds in Part One to give an account of how he was making a name for himself among the avant-garde just before the war, how he was lionised socially and how he launched the little magazine Blast to promote an anti-Romantic form of art. There are amusing anecdotes about clashes with the Italian artist Marinetti, who was promoting his Futurism against Lewis’ Vorticism. There is name-dropping about Lady Cunard. One gets the impression that the artistic avant-garde, no matter how “revolutionary” its pretensions, was an awfully comfy business.
Lewis describes meeting the Prime Minister Asquith at that self-promoting busybody Lady Ottoline Morrell’s table. The prime minister quizzed him about the arty movement he was involved in. Lewis records it thus:
As to his personality, it was that of a cultivated old clergyman, or he inhabited a borderline where Law and Divinity met. And he certainly had the manners a little (with me) of an investigating attorney, tempered with the courteous mildness of a sky-pilot. I might have been a client of his – a client whom he regarded with considerable mental reserve. And he would sit down beside me and start his questions, as if resolved to thoroughly go into the case, incessantly pulling at his nose, as if he were raking snuff.” (Part One , Chapter Five).
When he moves into Part Two, Lewis gives a typically contemptuous account of the mood of Britain when war was announced and the uncouth crowds rushed to recruiting offices. He tells amusing jokes about the behaviour of the Sitwells, takes a poke at Arnold Bennett as the “dictator” of book reviewers, notes how Gaudier Bzseska hastened to enlist in the French army when he realized that French culture was in danger, and speaks a little more respectfully of the admired coterie intellectual T.E.Hulme who later, as chance would have it, died in shellfire while manning an artillery battery not far from the one Lewis was manning.
If this sounds like opinionated chit-chat (and some of it is) it gets more interesting in Part Three (“A Gunner’s Tale”) when Lewis is in uniform on the Western Front, first as a bombardier and then as commanding officer of a battery. His general view of the Western Front is one that most historians would still endorse:
The Western Front, at the time of my service, was purely siege warfare. We might as well have been before a city which we were investing – except that we were both besieging armies, as it were – besieging each other. On this principle what would be the ‘Assaults’, if it were a regular old-fashioned siege of a place-forte, were the ‘Attacks’; namely the infantry-attacks. These were interminable attempts to put an end to the ‘Stalemate’. Throughout 1917 when I was there this was what was happening. Passchendaele – at which I was present – was the culmination of this. The British Army sustained enormous losses, to no purpose. It was the worst battle of the War, and the stupidest, which is saying a lot.” (Part Three, Chapter Three)
Most often in recounting his war experience, Lewis adopts an ironic, self-deprecating tone, frequently telling us that artillery men don’t really “fight”, as they never see their enemy face-to-face, and that they spend much of their time lounging about doing very little. Yet, for all this tone, it is clear that Lewis did see some of the horrors. After a big “push” he advances with squaddies through mashed-up fields of decapitated and dismembered corpses. He knows the mud-wading of Passchendaele. One chapter in particular is so macabre that it deserves to be anthologised as a classic of First World War experience. This is Part Three, Chapter Nine (“Hunting With a Howitzer”), where Lewis tells how he and some companions were methodically chased across a desolate moonscape by the explosions of German artillery shells, which were directed at them by a German observation balloon, which hung low and ominously over them.
Brighter (or plain silly) anecdotes dominate, however. The story of a scared squaddie who farted loudly each time shells exploded near their bunker, creating a musical counterpoint to the shells. The anecdote of the trimly-bearded artist Augustus John being routinely saluted by soldiers who mistook him for King George V on a clandestine visit to the trenches. Eventually Lewis’ real active service ended when he wangled a position as war artist, attached to the Canadian division at Vimy Ridge and undertaking his famous painting of a Canadian battery.
So to the “post-war” in the last two parts of the book. Lewis settles (Part Four) back into painting in London, making an income with portraits of the well-known, although some of the names he drops are now rather faded – Roy Campbell, Ronald Firbank, Noel Coward, the Sitwells (who rapidly became his enemies – Edith Sitwell he routinely identifies as “my enemy”), Nancy Cunard. The art scene gives Lewis the opportunity to comment on English Philistinism thus:
It is important to understand what an odd place England is to be an artist in, especially a painter. The English experience little response to artistic stimulus. In their bones, they are the ‘Philistines’ Matthew Arnold said they were. They have heard that they are ‘civilized’ and that civilized people are fond of art. So they make the necessary arrangements for the unavoidable presence of the fine arts in their midst. All ‘pictures’, when they come into the world, are to be sent immediately to a concentration camp, called Burlington House. And once a year the British Public will go and look at them. After that they will forget all about art until the same time next year.  (Part Four, Chapter Two)
On the whole, Part Four is most the dullest section of the book, though there is one chapter of such ambiguity that it deserves comment. In Part Four, Chapter Eight, Lewis describes his meetings with T.E.Lawrence. Clearly he is resisting the legend of “Lawrence of Arabia”, making a few cracks that cut Lawrence down to size. And yet at the same time it is clear that he half buys into that legend. Lawrence was, after all, one of those “men of action” whom he, as one who believed in a natural elite of leaders, admired.
Finally, in Part Five, he declares his allegiances and comes closest to an artistic and
literary credo. This is the part in which he gives detailed accounts of his meetings with Ezra Pound, T.S.Eliot and James Joyce. Much of this consists of a long narrative of a holiday he and Eliot took in Paris visiting Joyce, complete with anecdotes of Pound sending Joyce a pair of old shoes as a joke, and Joyce (who had wealthy patrons) producing fat wads of money to pay for every restaurant meal they ate.
Lewis begins this section with three chapters of general social and artistic criticism. His essential theme is that the avant-garde of his generation (“the men of 1914”) were genuinely trying to shake free of Romantic sentimentality and were in effect trying to construct a new Classicism in their hard objectivity. But, he claims, post-1926 a new Romantic sentimentality crept back into art thanks to commercialisation and the political polarisation of Left and Right. Both Left and Right, as they impinge upon art, have utopian plans to transform humanity, which again leads to idealisation in art. Hence sentimentality.
Of course Lewis’ style is rhetorical, his views tendentious and his tone egotistical (remember he’s defending the art of “his” generation, of whom he sees himself as a leader). One also notes how culturally specific his views are. We recall that in 1937, to many thinking Europeans, the combat of Communism and Fascism seemed to be what would decide the future of the world. Even so, and reading him nearly 80 years later, I have to concede that Lewis makes some palpable hits  - when, for example, he speaks of the “death” of opera, and when he notes that the “official” art of the extremes (Left and Right) is simply conservative 19th century art with propaganda bells on.
How am I to pass a verdict on this odd congeries of opinion, theory, anecdote, malice and above all egotism? Of course it is often self-contradictory. Of course Wyndham Lewis is often a pompous ass. It is abominably constructed, with Lewis too often not sticking to the point of his chosen subject and flying off at tangents. Yet so much of it is still fascinating – as a participant’s account, however biased, however prejudiced, of both the art world at a crucial time and the war. Still an invaluable read, then, for anyone interested in modernism and the directions of 20th century Western art. And so often as I read it, I recognised passages that have been quoted by biographers and social historians. This book has, in effect, been a primary source for other people who want to plough over its era.

Necessary Footnote: Blasting and Bombardiering has appeared in two distinct forms – the original 1937 edition and the revised edition which his widow Anne supervised in 1967, ten years after Lewis’ death. It is the latter which I have read. It contains all of the 1937 text, but Anne Wyndham Lewis decided to add three chapters that Lewis had written, related to the war. They are short works of fiction called “King of the Trenches”, about an eccentric army officer; and “Cantleman’s Spring Mate” and “War Baby”. Both the latter are sardonic stories of a soldier seducing a girl and impregnating her. Both are narrated with a sub-Nietzschean sense of love as being a mere power game, with the male character looking down condescendingly on the seduced woman. They are as tedious as hell and remind me how bad most of Lewis’ fictions are. Blasting and Bombardiering should have continued to do without them.

Something Thoughtful

Nicholas Reid reflects in essay form on general matters and ideas related to literature, history, popular culture and the arts, or just life in general. You are free to agree or disagree with him.


WAR AS TOURISM
 
ANZAC Day is celebrated this week, and I have been priming myself to write a long polemic on why I have such mixed feelings about this particular celebration, even if I think it is right and proper that a country should honour its war dead. But I’ve decided to save that long polemic for another day. Instead, let me strike out on another theme, inspired by a passage from Wyndham Lewis’s memoir Blasting and Bombardiering.
After he has been describing the scene of desolation as he saw it on the battlefield, Lewis reminds readers that it is what the soldier feels, and the immanent threat of death, that really makes the landscape one of desolation; and that therefore attempts to depict or reconstruct it are distortions:
To make a reconstruction of this landscape for a millionaire-sightseer, say, would be impossible. The sightseer would be the difficulty – for the reasons I have already given in my dissection of romance. This is a museum of sensations, not a collection of objects. For your reconstruction you would have to admit Death there as well, and he would never put in an appearance, upon those terms. You would have to line the trenches with bodies, guaranteed freshly killed that morning. No hospital could provide it. And unless people were mad they would not want – apart from the cost – to assemble the necessary ordinance, the engines required for this stunt of landscape-gardening. – Except that they were made, they would not have wanted ever to assemble it.”  (Wyndham Lewis Blasting and Bombardiering, Part Three, Chapter Four)
I’ve thought about this passage quite a lot recently, as we appear to be in an age of affluent sightseers who go off to look at old battlefields. This is especially true as the tourist industry feeds off the centenary of the First World War.
What are we attempting to capture at such sites? Are we remembering the dead with sorrow or respect? Or is it simply another tourist “experience”?
When I hear of the increasing numbers of young Australians and New Zealanders who go off to Anzac Cove at Gallipoli, for the annual commemoration, I might for a split second think as some wishful-thinking editorialists have, and imagine that this shows a growing interest in our history. But then I hear of the controversy over whether or not an Australian rock-band should play for the young visitors, and I know that this is just another entertainment, to be bracketed with the Munich October Fest or the running-of-the-bulls at Pamplona as part of what young Kiwis and Aussies do in their international holiday time.
I also consider how little there is of war to be seen at such sites. As I noted in an earlier posting [look up What Passing Bells? on the index at right] I was in Flanders, with some of my family, on Anzac Day last year [2014]. I went to an Australian-and-New Zealand ceremony, under light drizzle, at the British cemetery at Polygon Wood. I visited the well-maintained and reconstructed town of Messines, so tidy and neat that one would imagine no war had ever touched it, with its new statue of a New Zealand soldier in the main square. And I went to a specifically New Zealand ceremony on Messines Ridge. It was here in particular that I thought how impossible it really is to reconstruct war, even on the site of a century-old battle. Look across the very gently rolling Flemish countryside, and you would imagine that nothing had ever happened here, apart from centuries of peaceful farming.
And what if, for the tourists, somebody was to reconstruct dugouts and trenches here, complete with barbed wire and old ordinance? Such abominations have been set up on other old battled fields.
Frankly, I think it would be a mockery – a sanitised version of whatever it was that soldiers once experienced there, and less of a true memorial than the peaceful farmland telling us that war should be seen as an aberration.
Once upon a time, civilian spectators sat on nearby hillsides to watch the clash of armies. This was in the age before high-explosive shells had been invented, and before wars had become “total”. War could then be a spectator sport. But it hasn’t been that way at least since 1914, and tourism should not incline people to see it as a spectacle now.



Monday, April 13, 2015

Something New


We feature each week Nicholas Reid's reviews and comments on new and recent books.  

“ISIS – THE STATE OF TERROR” by Jessica Stern and J.M.Berger (Harper-Collins, $NZ34:99)
 
Is it ISIS, ISIL or simply IS? Early in the piece, the authors of this book explain that IS (Islamic State) is the designation they prefer, but many Western governments choose not to use this term as it implies that these radical Sunni jihadists have already achieved their aim of creating an autonomous state. ISIL is the term that the US government prefers (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) and that President Obama often uses in his speeches. However Western journalists prefer ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), which is now the best-known designation. So, willy-nilly, the authors opt for ISIS.
What sort of book is this book? Of course it’s the higher journalism, and like all journalism (as the authors openly acknowledge) it is provisional and perishable. Being published this year, it is up-to-date enough to mention the fall-out from the Charlie Hebdo murders. But it is an investigation into an ongoing situation that is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Doubtless that situation will look very different, and require a very different sort of book, in two or three years’ time.
It is also a book aimed principally at non-Muslim infidels like you and me. The text is preceded by a twelve-page glossary of Muslim terms and a timeline of recent relevant historical events. After the 256 pages of text, but before the 25 pages of index and the 84 pages of notes and the 5 pages of acknowledgements in which Jessica Stern and J.M.Berger separately thank their sources, there are 44 pages of Appendix, written by a doctoral student in religious studies, on the core beliefs of Islam and its various factions.
Finally I have to note that it is not boots-on-the-ground journalism. Jessica Stern is a lecturer on terrorism at Harvard. J.M.Berger is a fellow of the Brookings Institution and contributor to Foreign Policy magazine. Their report has been researched through secondary sources, interviews, declassified information and (as parts of the text make very clear) very close gleaning of what is – or has been – available on the Internet. Stern and Berger view the situation from a distance, but with a clear sense of the real danger ISIS entails.
ISIS – The State of Terror opens with the horror of televised ISIS executions of hostages and prisoners, who are dressed provocatively in orange, consciously echoing the garb of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. ISIS revels in publicising such public violence, as a sign of its resolve and its refusal to compromise, but also as a means of both provoking and intimidating the West. Immediately the authors describe the shocked Western reaction where:
In corner stores and restaurants, on television and radio broadcasts, over dinner tables and on social media, people began to ask: Why can’t the most powerful nations on earth stop these medieval-minded killers? The question soon transformed into an anger not seen since the days after the 11 September 2001 attacks.” (p.5)
Rather than being a parade of such horrors, however, the book becomes an enquiry into how ISIS operates, to whom it appeals, what its aims are and what the appropriate response of the West should be. In their account, the group that eventually became ISIS was founded by Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al Kalaylah, whom they characterise as “a Jordanian thug turned terrorist”. He adopted the name Abu Mursala al Zarqawi. As a Sunni Muslim, he was motivated by the American occupation of Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship had been supported by Iraq’s minority Sunni Muslims. They were the backbone of his Ba’athist Party. Under the US occupation, however, over 100,000 Sunnis were dismissed from their government positions, and Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslim majority waged a campaign against Sunnis. Sunnis were a great recruiting ground for a jihadist movement that opposed both the new Iraqi government and the American occupation. Enter Abu Mursala al Zarqawi to recruit them. He was killed in 2010 and succeeded as the head of the new movement by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi who “began on the path of jihad” during the US-led invasion.
As the authors note, ISIS got another major boost in recruits when it was able to infiltrate and take over groups fighting against Assad’s dictatorship in the ongoing Syrian civil war. One could say that the initial Western delusions about an “Arab spring” finally died in this civil war. Those who oppose dictatorships are not necessarily seeking to replace them with anything resembling democracies. ISIS was also able to access huge funding for propaganda once it captured the Iraqi city of Mosul and looted the wealth of its banks. It is now probably the best-funded terrorist organization in the world.
At first ISIS was affiliated to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda, but there were tensions between the two groups. Basically al Qaeda, backed mainly by wealthy Saudi Arabians, was concerned to wage war on foreign infidels. They were happy to have ISIS as their followers but were very concerned that ISIS was as eager to pursue Shi’ite Muslims as infidels. To al Qaeda, ISIS seemed a bit of a rabble and, much as it may surprise non-Muslim Westerners, al Qaeda had qualms about Muslims killing other Muslims, or attempting to impose strict Sharia law too soon on converts to Islam. The authors of ISIS – The State of Terror quote an intercepted caution sent by one al Qaeda cell to another: “AQAP … advised AQIM to refrain from immediately instituting the jihadists’ harsh interpretation of Islamic law. ‘you can’t beat people for drinking alcohol when they don’t even know the basics of how to pray,’ one letter stated.” (pp.114-115)
There were broader issues on which ISIS eventually broke with al Qaeda, refused to see it as its superior, and embarked on its own course.
Al Qaeda saw itself as a “vanguard” group, carrying out acts of terror against the West on the assumption that this would lead to Western retaliation, which in turn would lead to a massive popular Muslim uprising. This was the concept of a “leaderless” Muslim revolution, where al Qaeda was simply lighting the populist spark.
ISIS had, and has, no such strategic approach. Its aim is quite simply the set up a specific territorial area as the base from which a new unified and international caliphate will spread. ISIS has no faith in a spontaneous Muslim popular uprising. Within this new caliphate, the people will be ruled strictly by the caliphate’s hierarchy. The propaganda presented to potential recruits is that the caliphate (proclaimed by ISIS in June 2014) is already here and is building and has a place for all classes of (strictly Sunni Muslim) society. The caliph will, of course, claim headship of the whole Muslim world. To make a crude analogy (mine – not the authors’), al Qaeda is like Trotskyists aiming for permanent international revolution. ISIS is like Stalinists building “socialism in one country”. The authors most concisely identify the difference between al Qaeda and ISIS thus:
In the end, al Qaeda’s failure was the failure of all vanguard movements – an assumption that the masses, once awakened, will not require close supervision, specific guidance, and a vision that extends beyond fighting. Al Qaeda’s vision is – often explicitly – nihilistic. ISIS, for all its barbarity, is both more pragmatic and more utopian. Hand in hand with its tremendous capacity for destruction, it also seeks to build. Most vanguard extremist movements paradoxically believe that ordinary people are afflicted with deep ignorance, yet such movements also expect that once their eyes have been opened, the masses will instinctively know what to do next. ISIS does not take the masses for granted; its chain of influence extends beyond the elite, beyond its strategists and loyal fighting force, out into the world. Its propaganda is not simply a call to arms, it is also a call for non-combatants, men and women alike, to build a nation-state alongside the warriors with a role for engineers, doctors, filmmakers, sysadmins, and even traffic cops.” (pp.73-74)
Surprisingly, a very large part of this book is not taken up with further analysis of how the ISIS “state” runs, though atrocities, reported by defecting jihadists, are covered. What concerns the authors more is how ISIS is able to recruit, using social media, the Internet and television. Al Qaeda pioneered this, but did not quite get the electronic approach right:
The terrorist group [al Qaeda] had generally kept up with the technology of the day, but in the realm of social media, it was slightly slower to adopt the latest trends. The centre of gravity for jihadist extremists online had settled onto password-protected message boards, highly structured discussion forums that were carefully moderated by activists who were members of al Qaeda, or very closely aligned with such.” (p.65)
In contrast, ISIS rapidly adopted “a feedback-loop model” for disseminating their propaganda on the ‘net, with as many accounts as possible fully open to comment by anyone who wished to look at them. The result was tens of millions of ISIS-affiliated tweets on Twitter and images shared on Facebook and a huge audience of potential recruits. As Stern and Berger tell it, Youtube, Facebook and Twitter were very slow to close down ISIS-related accounts, and some Western security services advised against closing them down because, they argued, such accounts provided intelligence information and helped our official Watchers to keep track of potential jihadists. To which the authors reply tartly
“… allowing child pornographers to operate on line without impediment would undoubtedly yield tremendous intelligence about child pornographers. Yet no-one ever argues this is a reasonable trade-off.” (p.141)
For Stern and Berger, ISIS’s public executions and dissemination of atrocity images are meant to serve a twofold purpose. The first is to warn what awaits anyone who resists (a bit like the old German military doctrine of Schrecklichkeit). The second is to inure ISIS followers and subjects to the murder, rape and torture they themselves might be required to commit:
While ISIS may not articulate its reasons in this manner, we believe it is deliberately engaged in a process of blunting empathy, attracting individuals already inclined towards violence, frightening victims into compliance, and projecting this activity out to the wider world. The long-term effects of this calculated brutality are likely to be severe, with higher rates of various forms of PTSD, increased rates of secondary psychopathy, and, sadly, more violence.” (p.218)
What I find deficient in this book is a long term explanation of why jihadists in general (of which ISIS is the latest and, apparently, most virulent example) have come out of longer historical conditions. Yes, there is an account of how ISIS arose in reaction to the US-led war on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq; but the book scarcely glances at the longer history of Western exploitation of what we call loosely “the Middle East”.
For all that, ISIS – The State of Terror does not function as a drumbeater for Western intervention. By and large, the authors are critical of US foreign policy up to this point; and they speak negatively of earlier interventions, as when they declare:
Armed with irrational exuberance and a handful of dubious pretexts for war, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq on 20 March 2003. The invasion had been justified by exaggerated claims that Iraq possessed or was close to possessing weapons of mass destruction, and by the false claim that Saddam Hussein was allied with al Qaeda. While Iraq had a long history of sponsoring terrorist groups, al Qaeda was not one of them.” (p.17)
They note the huge wasted effort, and wasted money, spent trying to build up credible post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi armed forces:
 The United States had invested $25 billion in training and equipping the Iraqi army over the course of eight years. That investment evaporated in the blink of an eye as Iraqi soldiers turned tail and fled in the face of ISIS’s assaults on Mosul.” (p.45)
The reasons given for the 2003 invasion are refuted and the results criticised:
Terror can make us strike back at the wrong enemy, for the wrong reasons, or both (as was the case with the 2003 invasion of Iraq). We want to wage war, not just on terrorism, but also on terror, to banish the feeling of being unjustly attacked or unable to protect the blameless. We want to wage war on evil. Sometimes the effect of our reaction is precisely what we aimed to thwart – more terrorists and more attacks, spread more broadly around the world. While some politicians wanted to see Iraq during the allied invasion as a roach motel, we see it more like a hornets’ nest – with allied bombs and bullets spreading the hornets ever further, throughout the region and beyond.” (pp.199-200)
There are also these chilling, but necessary, words:
 The only thing worse than a brutal dictator is no state at all. The rise of ISIS is, to some extent, the unintended consequence of Western intervention in Iraq. Coalition forces removed a brutal dictator from power, but they also broke the Iraqi state. The West lacked the patience, the will, and the wisdom to build a new, inclusive one. What remained were ruins.” (pp. 237-238)
The authors also quote (on pp. 239-240) the disillusioned words of General Daniel P. Bolger (ret.), a senior commander in Iraq, on how little intervention in Iraq achieved and how foolish intervention was in the first place. I can imagine his words appearing in many an anti-war pamphlet should we once again be asked to furnish boots-on-the-ground in Iraq.
So what, finally, is the authors’ view on how the powerful part of the West should respond to ISIS? They suggests a rigorous surveillance of all social and electronic media, a blocking of all ISIS propaganda in any format, a complete ban on travel to ISIS-controlled areas, prosecution of anyone recruiting jihadists and arrest of suspected recruits before they can leave. They also imply an economic blockade. But they strongly suggest that any armed intervention would simply give credence to the apocalyptic ISIS scenario of a crusade by infidels against their holy state, and would thus serve only to recruit more jihadists to the ISIS cause.
I’m not sure that all will agree with this scenario. But despite both its provisional nature and its defects (including some passages that look like rhetorical “padding”), ISIS – The State of Terror is a very good primer on a major current issue.

Something Old


Not everything worth reading is hot off the press. In this section, we recommend "something old" that is still well worth reading. "Something old" can mean anything from a venerable and antique classic to a good book first published four or more years ago. 

“MEMOIRS OF MADAME DE LA TOUR DU PIN” (“Le Journal d’une femme de cinquante ans”, written between 1820 and 1840; edited and translated into English by Felice Harcourt - English translation first published 1969)

Sometimes people of no particular achievement and no notable intellectual attainment can write memoirs that are very revealing about the times in which they lived. One such specimen was Madame de la Tour du Pin. I first came across the English translation of her memoirs about twenty years ago, and read them with great delight – not because I endorsed or shared her worldview, but because she expressed so perfectly the attitudes and values of her social class. The historian in me was constantly interested in how she (and implicitly others of her social standing) saw the events of the French revolution and much that followed it.
The Marquise de la Tour du Pin (1770-1853) was born Henriette-Lucy Dillon, the Irish surname coming from the fact that she was descended from an Irish family who had supported King James II in 1688 and therefore had fled to France when William of Orange usurped the British throne. In France the family were ennobled by Louis XIV. Henriette-Lucy was largely brought up by her grandmother in the house of her great-uncle the Archbishop of Narbonne.
In her teens Henriette-Lucy Dillon became a lady-in-waiting to Queen Marie-Antoinette in her last troubled days at Versailles. She married the Comte de Gouvernet, who later inherited the title de la Tour du Pin and who held a diplomatic post in The Hague early in the revolution. Henriette-Lucy and her husband were in Paris in 1793, at the time Louis XVI was executed. They managed to escape imprisonment and execution in the Terror by retiring to the de la Tour du Pin estate, Chateau du Bouilh, near Bordeaux. Still under threat from the Jacobins (the radical faction in the revolution), the couple managed to escape to America with the surprising help of Madame de Fontenay, the wife of the notorious Tallien, one of the most zealous of the “Terrorists”.
Husband and wife lived as amateur farmers in Albany, in upstate New York, for some of the mid-1790s. Because the Comte de la Tour du Pin was a diplomat, they were acquainted with the wily ex-bishop and diplomat Talleyrand, who was also at this time sitting out the revolution in America and who was later to become an important figure in the couple’s life. All three returned to France in the Directory period, when the Terror was over, but then fled into exile again, this time to England, when the Fructidor coup of 1798 purged possible royalist sympathisers. As French émigrés in England, they had some blood relatives among the English gentry. They welcomed the advent of Napoleon as a stabilising influence, and returned to France in 1800. The Comte de la Tour du Pin worked in Napoleon’s diplomatic service, but accepted the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814, did not support Napoleon’s return in 1815 (the “Hundred Days”), and therefore was part of the French contingent negotiating at the Congress of Vienna.
The Marquise de la Tour du Pin lived to the ripe old age of 83. She wrote her memoirs mainly in the 1820s (although she was still tinkering with them by the late 1830s), addressing them to her sole surviving son Aymar. She was in her fifties in the 1820s, hence the title her memoirs were given when they were published years later, Le Journal d’une Femme de Cinquante Ans. She stops her narrative in 1815.
From this brief summary of her life, you can see that how she lived was mainly dictated by the changing historical situation in France – the end of the Bourbon monarchy, the revolution, the Terror, the Directory, Fructidor, Napoleon, the end of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbons.
How do we assess her memoirs? They are the memoirs of a minor French aristocrat, often limited in her judgments by her education and class. Her memoirs are very gossipy – naturally filled with family details of limited historical interest. She is frequently, and quite un-self-consciously, vain about her own good looks, wit and superiority. Often they read as the memoirs of a supernumerary or hanger-on who, quite falsely, sees herself as being at the centre of events.
Husband and wife are (naturally and understandably) often trimmers in dangerous historical times. (I recently reviewed for Landfall an excellent new biography of the great French explorer Dumont D’Urville, and I realise how much being a trimmer was the natural condition of most educated French people in revolutionary and Napoleonic times.)  Basically they belong to the ancien regime – Madame de la Tour du Pin is often snobbish in her judgments upon later upstarts who did not manage the effortless style of her own aristocratic generation – such as the ladies of Napoleon’s court. And yet the couple’s attitudes are not inflexible. The weaknesses and inadequacies of the ancien regime are duly noted. Napoleon is admired as the restorer of French honour. And the Restoration of 1814 is seen as faintly ridiculous. (Bear in mind that France had undergone yet another revolution and regime change in 1830, before these memoirs were first published in France).
There is, I repeat, absolutely nothing remarkable in the mind that produced these memoirs. Perhaps this is the real reason that they are historically interesting. They show the judgments and reaction and prejudices that were typical of Madame de la Tour du Pin’s minor aristocratic class.
And yet… and yet…. I do not wish to underestimate Madame de la Tour du Pin any more than I want to build her up as a major literary figure. Sometimes her observations and judgments are quite shrewd – even witty – and she has seen enough not to romanticise “the good old days”. She knows full well that the revolution was not causeless and did not come out of nowhere.
To illustrate the quality of this book, I can do no better than to quote some of the passages that found their way into my reading diary. [All page numbers are according to the Harvill Press edition of 1969.]
Here is Madame de la Tour du Pin on the destructive laxity and scepticism of the old regime:
In my earliest years, I saw things which might have been expected to warp my mind, pervert my affections, deprave my character and destroy in me every notion of religion and morality. From the age of ten I heard around me the freest conversations and the expression of the most ungodly principles. Brought up, as I was, in an Archbishop’s house where every rule of religion was broken daily, I was fully aware that my lessons in dogma and doctrine were given no more importance than those in history and geography.” (pp.13-24)
She notes that in this archbishop’s household, there was not even a chaplain to serve daily devotional needs. She goes on to speak of the general breakdown of public morality:
The profligate reign of Louis XV had corrupted the nobility and among the Court Nobles could be found instances of every form of vice. Gaming, debauchery, immorality, irreligion, were all flaunted openly. The hierarchy of the Church, summoned to Paris for those congresses of the clergy which the King… was obliged to call every year… had also been corrupted by contact with the dissolute habits of the Court… The older I grew… the more sure I became that the revolution of 1789 was only the inevitable consequence and, I might almost say, the just punishment of the vices of the upper classes, vices carried to such excess that if people had not been stricken with a mortal blindness, they must have seen that they would inevitably have been consumed by the very fire they themselves were lighting.” (pp.26-27)
Having been a young courtier, she paints an affectionate enough portrait of Louis XVI, but she is not dazzled by him:
He was stout, about five feet six or seven inches tall, square-shouldered and with the worst possible bearing. He looked like some peasant shambling along behind his plough; there was nothing proud or regal about him. His sword was a continual embarrassment to him and he never knew what to do with his hat, yet in court dress he looked really magnificent” (pp.71-72)
As she deals with the events that led up to the revolution, she is highly critical of the king’s inactivity and sequestration at Versailles, but she is even more critical of what she sees as the devious behaviour of the leader of the rival branch of the royal family, the Duc d’Orleans. She interprets his actions as undermining real royal authority in his own interests. As for the abolition of feudal dues and rights, she is livid as one would expect a minor aristocrat to be, declaring of this early revolutionary event:
“… the happenings of the night of the 4th of August when, on the motion of the Vicomte de Noailles, it was decreed that feudal rights should be abolished, ought to have convinced even the most incredulous that the National Assembly was unlikely to stop at this first measure of dispossession. The decree ruined my father-in-law and our family never recovered from the effect of that night’s session. It was a veritable orgy of iniquities.” (pp.116-117)
Lafayette is depicted as an honest but theatrical fool who did not realize how much he was being manipulated by Orleans. The story that royal troops donned the white cockade and cursed the people is discounted as a fiction. And we get this unflattering description of Marie-Antoinette:
She was gifted with very great courage, but very little intelligence, absolutely no tact and, worst of all, a mistrust – always misplaced – of those most willing to serve her. She refused to recognise that the terrible danger which had threatened her on the night of the 6th of October was the result of a plot by the Duc d’Orleans, and from then on vented her resentment on all the people of Paris and avoided appearing in public.” (p.139)
While she is largely contemptuous of the feast of federation on 14 July 1790 (the first official celebration of “Bastille Day”, at a time when the king was still on the throne) she is generous enough in spirit to acknowledge the high ideals that motivated it:
Laundresses and knights of St.Louis worked side by side in that great gathering of all the people; there was not the slightest disorder or the smallest dispute. Everyone was moved by the same impulse: fellowship.” (pp.142-143)
She is scandalised by army officers who fled abroad early in the revolution, leaving the armed forces to more radical “other ranks” and hence hastening the breakdown of order and violence against the royal state. She quotes with approval (p.160) Napoleon’s later observation that “Had I been in Lafayette’s place, the king would still be sitting on his throne.”  She also gives a chilling account of the silence that fell on the city of Paris (p.177) on the morning that the king was executed, while she and her husband, in their house outside the old city walls, awaited evidence of popular revulsion against the act of regicide.
Some of her portraits of individuals are waspish and backhanded. Here she is on the revolutionary era’s supreme trimmer Talleyrand:
M. de Talleyrand was amiable, as he unvaryingly was to me, and his conversation had a grace and ease which has never been surpassed. He had known me since my childhood and always talked to me with an almost paternal politeness which was delightful. One might, in one’s inmost mind, regret having so many reasons for not holding him in respect, but memories of his wrong-doing were always dispelled by an hour of his conversation. Worthless himself, he had, oddly enough, a horror of wrong-doing in others. Listening to him, and not knowing him, one thought him a virtuous man. Only his exquisite sense of propriety prevented him from saying things to me which would have displeased me, and if, as sometimes happened, they did escape him, he would recollect himself immediately, and say: ‘Ah yes, but you don’t like that.’ ”  (p.246)
Later she remarks that “It was impossible to feel surprise at anything M. de Talleyrand did, unless, perhaps, it should be something lacking in taste. Although he served a government drawn from the dregs of the gutter, he himself remained a very great gentleman.” (p.304)
The sniffy ancien regime aristocrat comes out in Madame de la Tour du Pin when she describes Napoleon’s wife Josephine (pp.341-342) as “gracious, amiable and kindly…not outstandingly intelligent” and obviously not the sort of upper crust lady who would once have been received at royal Versailles.
In the closing pages of her memoirs, there is a continuous ambiguity in Madame de la Tour du Pin’s attitude towards the restored Bourbon monarchy. She openly expresses the opinion that the Bourbons had learned nothing in their years of exile, that they were weak and indecisive and that they shamed France in comparison with the military glories of Napoleon. But her sense of loyalty still makes her see Bonapartists as upstarts and she presents her husband as having made the right decision in standing by Louis XVIII and not joining the Hundred Days.
If you feel that I (and Madame de la Tour du Pin) have been boring you with the minutiae of French history, allow me to add that Madame de la Tour du Pin does tell some quite delightful anecdotes that have little to do with historical circumstances. She relates the tale (p.145) of a highly intelligent convent-educated girl who read the Classics in the original and who, when finally coming out of the convent in 1790, was bewildered to find that modern France was nothing like the world described in Caesar’s commentaries. Then there is this little gem, with which I will close:
We received a visit from the father of M. d’Aix, a gentleman of the old school, without a vestige of intelligence or learning. It used to be said of him that he had, quite literally, bored his wife to death. Nonetheless, he enjoyed an income of sixty thousand francs or more a year…” (p.357)
Ah yes – boring, wealthy idiots. They are always with us.

Egotistical footnote: If the general subject of this “Something Old” interests you, you might be interested to look up, via on the index at right, my takes on Thomas Carlyle’s The French Revolution (the dyspeptic Scot’s version of the whole sequence of events); Frances Mossiker’s The Queen’s Necklace (about a great pre-revolutionary scandal) and Benjamin Constant’s Adolphe (his novel which gives a fictionalised version of his affair with Madame de Stael, whom Madame de la Tour du Pin credits in her memoirs with influencing appointments to the French Foreign Office in the Napoleonic era, when her husband was a diplomat). You might also look up my take on Honore de Balzac’s wonderful novel La Rabouilleuse / The Black Sheep, which concerns in part the discontents of former Bonapartists. You might have noticed that French history and literature are things that interest me.