Nicholas
Reid reflects in essay form on general matters and ideas related to
literature, history, popular culture and the arts, or just life in general. You are free to agree
or disagree with him.
MY REPREHENSIBLE SCHADENFREUDE
Long before the German
term “Schadenfreude” became current, La
Rochefoucault wrote in his Maximes
<< Dans l’adversite de nos
meilleurs amis, nous trouvons toujours quelque chose qui ne nous deplait pas.>>
“In the misfortunes of our best friends, we always find something that does not
displease us”. You are not in primary
school, so I do not need to explain to you what Schadenfreude is, but I do like
to demonstrate that this very human impulse was noted long before the term
itself was used.
At
my age, I find I am frequently enjoying a special sort of Schadenfreude. More and more the type which I harbour does
not have to do directly with the misfortunes of others. More and more it has to
do with the delusions of others, as revealed by the passage of time. I find
myself laughing at chickens coming home to roost. Laughing as I see the obvious
consequences of ideas that were once fashionable. Perhaps this form of
Schadenfreude is simply a function of aging and having had more experience.
My
most shameful and puerile form of Schadenfreude relates to feminism – a very general term, I know, but
comprehensible to you nevertheless. How eager second-wave feminists were, when
I was a lad in the 1960s and 1970s, to tell us that a new day of gender equity
was dawning, the voices of women were being heard and society was going to be
changed massively. I don’t disagree with any of this, except to note that
society did not necessarily change in the way the feminists of those times suggested.
When they decried traditional gender roles as mere social constructs, they
opened the way for others to argue that the notion of gender itself was a mere social
construct. There is, goes the new orthodoxy in some quarters, no such thing as
hard-wired, biologically-based, male and female genders.
So we now have an old feminist warrior like Germaine Greer getting “de-platformed” by younger university zealots for saying that she does not consider “trans-gender women” to be “real women”. Second- and some third-wave feminists
identified the enemy as those people with penises. They are now decried for
daring to think in “binary” terms.
So the gender wars go on – yesterday’s radicals now dismissed as bigots by a
new orthodoxy.
And
on the sidelines I snigger and sometimes guffaw at the spectacle of old
zealotry at war with new. Sweet
Schadenfreude.
The
much sweeter Schadenfreude, the one related to a topic in which I am better
versed, has to do with quite a different matter.
When
I was tutoring and lecturing in History a few years ago, it was becoming
fashionable for some young historians to say that all history, as it had been
written up to that point, was simply a fabrication on the same level as works
of fiction. After all, all history was written from a particular point of view
and all evidence utilised by historians was merely a selection of the total
evidence available. Therefore it was not really evidence, but simply a means of
supporting pre-conceived arguments. Instead of history, what we were reading
were mere “narratives”.
What
I am referring to here is the postmodernist approach to history – and
typically, postmodernists had no way of resolving the “problem” they thought
they had diagnosed. They were, in effect, negating the whole concept of
academic history, and replacing it with subjectivism. One proselytiser
following this path told a lecture-room-ful of students that such apparatus as
footnotes, bibliographies and cross-referencing were mere sleight of hand
deployed by older historians to make subjective fictions look authoritative.
She became somewhat annoyed when I asked whether postmodernist historians also
used footnotes, bibliographies and cross-referencing, and she had to answer in
the affirmative.
Like
many wrong theories, the postmodernist view of history has an element of truth
to it. Historians do indeed write in their own style and from their own
perspective, and often they reflect the assumptions of their own age, sex,
social class, ethnicity and belief system. Good historians will overtly declare
their biases and compensate for them. But to note this obvious truism is not to
say that there is no such thing as objective history and objective historical
facts. You will get a real grasp of history only if you are prepared to read
different books on the same events written from many different points of view,
and then weigh up the evidence (preferably with the help of primary sources) to
judge which explanations of events are the most plausible. Of course material
facts can be manipulated. Of course material facts can be used selectively to
create a dishonest argument. Of course some uncertainties about the truth will
still remain, and there is no such thing as “final history” in which all
questions are answered. Even so, it is an objective and verifiable truth that
honest historians are seeking. As the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, despite
his own ideological bias, put it: “The
fact that a mountain can be viewed from thousands of pespectives does not mean
that the mountain doesn’t exist”.
Yet
all this the postmodernists denied and still deny. There are no objective
facts. There is no history upon which we can agree. There are only subjective
“narratives”. And (though this is hardly ever articulated by postmodernists),
the logical consequence of this theory is that one narrative is as good as
another – after all, there is nothing objective to measure a narrative against.
I
will illustrate the problem with an anecdote. At a History Department
gathering, I met a postmodernist theorist who has just published a book on the
nature of history. When I asked him what the nature of history was, as expounded
in his book, he proceeded to give postmodernist theory very much as I have
outlined it above. “But what about the
material facts of history?” I asked him. His clincher reply was “Yes, but what is a fact?” Obviously for
him, historical facts were merely agreed fictions. So I decided to ramp it up a
little. “Okay,” I said “if you believe that, what arguments would
you have to refute somebody who said that the Nazis never committed genocide –
I mean Holocaust-deniers who say it was all a big hoax?”
He
paused for a moment before giving his brilliant response: “Well I’d say there are a lot of silly people in the world.”
I
agree that there are indeed many silly people in the world – postmodernist
historians among them – but this answer was so inadequate that I decided to
break off our colloquy and headed for the wine and cheese and more congenial
company.
Think
about it for a moment. You are refuting a conspiracy theorist or
Holocaust-denier. Surely you would refer to the mass of evidence, the relevant
documents, the surviving remnants of death camps, not to mention the copious
recorded testimony of both survivors and perpetrators in sound archives and
films and memoirs. In other words, you would produce material evidence in the
established way, right? But apparently not. According to the postmodernist, you
would simply point to the conspiracy theorist and say : “You’re just being silly.”
That
would definitively answer all questions, wouldn’t it?
By
this stage you are either (a.) asleep; or (b.) asking what this has got to do
with Schadenfreude.
Simply
this. Quite a while ago, I concluded that postmodernist thinking led to a world
in which truth was irrelevant because the idea of objective and demonstrable
truth was denied. My narrative is as good as your narrative and any assertions
about truth and falsehood are specious. I further concluded that this was one
of the foundations of the “post-truth” world.
And
here comes the Schadenfreude.
Only
recently, a few people have come to realise the connection. Here’s Donald Trump
labelling as “fake news” anything he disagrees with or anything that makes him
uncomfortable. Surely he should be hailed as a great exponent of postmodernism,
right? After all, there is no objective truth, is there? My narrative is as good as your’s, so who can
say I am wrong when I label news as “fake news”?
If
you are going to reply to these questions by referring to material and
objective facts then you are implicitily (bless you!) ditching postmodernism,
in which everything is subjective.
I
know that these arguments can be reduced to slogans in the toxic atmosphere
that apprently prevails on some American campuses. “Facts don’t care about your feelings”, says one campus t-shirt
slogan (= bastardised objectivity) “My experience is more important than your
facts” counters another popular campus slogan (= bastardised subjectivity).
I am not a reductionist, so I do not approve of boiling complex arguments down
to slogans.
But
I do believe in having a good laugh. So I laughed heartily when, in a couple of recent articles lamenting the
Trump phenomenon and published in the NZ
Listener, an American commentator tentatively suggested that the contempt
for facts practised by Trump and his allies is in part an offshoot of
postmodernism’s contempt for objective truth.
“So the hacks are catching up with what I
could already have told them, “ I thought smugly.
And
the tears of joyful Schadenfreude rolled down my cheeks.
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