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We feature each week Nicholas Reid's reviews and comments on new and recent books.
“PHONEY WARS – NEW ZEALAND
SOCIETY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR” by Stevan Eldred-Grigg (with Hugh
Eldred-Grigg) (Otago University Press, $NZ 49:95)
Over
a decade ago, when I was studying theology, one lecturer told us how we could
become immortal. It had nothing to do with religion or a possible afterlife. It
had to do with scholarship. The trick was this: you write an article for a
scholarly journal in which you make an outrageous or downright silly case, with
which you know every other scholar will disagree. You can then be sure that
every time another scholar writes on the same topic, he or she will have to
spend some time refuting your hypothesis, even if only in footnotes. So your
name will appear in thousands of articles and books. Scholarly immortality!
I
wonder if Stevan Eldred-Grigg had the same objective in mind in writing Phoney Wars? Eldred-Grigg’s latest book (co-authored
with Hugh Eldred-Grigg) presents much factual and documentary detail, but it is
more polemic than history and it argues its case stridently. As Eldred-Grigg surely
knows, many (most?) historians will disgree with his case. It is that it would
have been better for New Zealand never to have joined the Allies in fighting
the Second World War. Just as stridently, Eldred-Grigg argued in his earlier
book The Great Wrong War (reviewed
on this blog) that New Zealand was wrong to be involved in the First World War.
As I said in my review of The Great Wrong
War, it is relatively easy to be negative about the First World War
because, to most people, it appears to be just the clash of greedy, rival
empires. But, for most people, the Allies in the Second World War had the
admirable aim of destroying Nazism and Japanese militarism, and it is far more
difficult to denigrate or satirise their role. Like it or not, the Second World
War is still (as I said in another posting) popularly seen as The One True Good War.
How
does Eldred-Grigg make his case? In his introduction, he asserts: “Ultimately there was no compelling reason
for New Zealand to involve itself in the war. As a small state ocupying a
position of zero strategic significance, its contribution to a war waged
between great powers was negligible.” (p.12)
As
he is winding up the book, he asks rhetorically “Why had the dominion been fighting?” and declares: “The Labour government never made anything
other than vague statements about why. Cabinet chose to declare war on several
states, and the declaration of war was given the rubber stamp by the National
Party. Yet no group of politicians or state officials ever sat down to draw up
a list of goals to be won for the dominion by going into the struggle. New
Zealand had no ‘war aims’ to use the jargon of diplomacy, other than the very
woolly one of helping the motherland and other states fight Japan, Italy and
Germany. And why had the motherland been fighting? A lot of sonorous phrases
were spoken, but in many ways the British government went to war in order to
follow its old policy of stopping any one state from being overwhelmingly
strong in Europe.” (pp.328-329)
The
tone of his argument rarely changes in the 300-plus pages between these two
statements. Eldred-Grigg never concedes that defeating an expansionist
totalitarian state might have been a good aim in itself. Even more damagingly,
he rarely acknowledges that (alien though it may be to us later generations) majority
popular New Zealand sentiment at that time did see this country as an extension
of Britain, and saw nothing “woolly”
in helping a “motherland”.
No,
it isn’t how we think in the early 21st century, but it was a
persuasive motive in 1939.
After
his introduction, Eldred-Grigg (Chapter 1) gives a once–over-lightly of New
Zealand’s foreign and domestic policies in the 1930s, presenting the country as
ruled by conservative interests with the dominant media being conservative newspapers,
despite the popularity of the Labour government’s social democratic welfare
policies. He makes much of the evils of empires and colonialism, especially as
New Zealand was involved in ruling Pacific islands that would have preferred to
be independent. This sets him up for a long argument in Chapter 5 that the
Allies were massively hypocritical to claim to be defending “freedom” and
“democracy” when they themselves (the British, French, Dutch and Americans)
kept control – often by force – of large empires.
Moving
on to the first phase of the war, September 1939 to June 1940, (Chapter 2)
Eldred-Grigg argues that it was not to New Zealand’s economic advantage to go
to war. We could, he claims, have found trading partners other than war-beset
Britain. Britain was itself a repressive country and we were in effect supporting
their repressive empire. (He lingers over the unpopularity of Commonwealth
troops – including New Zealanders – with Egytian nationalists.) And then there
were all those dreadful things the government did in the way of wartime
censorship and cracking down on pacifists.
When
the war really gets going in Europe, June 1940 to December 1941, (Chapter 3),
Eldred-Grigg says that it was simply not our war but, as his chapter title puts
it, “A War Far Away”, and therefore of no concern to us. After some debates and
misgivings over the matter, the Labour government and most unions agreed to
conscription. Much of what Eldred-Grigg says in this chapter about the
inconveniences of rationing, the attempts to conscript wealth as well as men,
and the opposition National Party’s
failure to persuade the Labour government to form a waritme coalition,
are the standard fare in history books concerning this period.
Not
standard fare, however, is his chapter (Chapter 4) dealing with the Pacific
war, December 1941 to December 1942. Eldred-Grigg strains hard to present a
tolerant and forbearing Japanese government goaded into war by American and
British trade practices and embargoes. When Japan signed on to an alliance with
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, “Wellington
made the mistake… of thinking that the alliance meant Japan was getting ready
to go to war against the British Commonwealth.” (p.181) Goodness! How naïve
of Wellington! Eldred-Grigg keeps reminding us that the Guomindang government
of China was not a democracy (and therefore, presumably, we should feel less
sympathy for the Chinese when they came under Japanese attack); and he ridicules
the New Zealand government for now having to rely on United States naval assstance
as opposed to the British naval assistance they thought they could rely on. New
Zealand fears of Japanese invasion were, in Eldred-Grigg’s telling, absurd
because Japan was so far away. Besides, weren’t New Zealanders (and other
Allies) nasty racists in the demeaning images of Japanese whicch they used in
wartime propaganda?
In
his Introduction, Eldred-Grigg has said “The
war, contrary to the propaganda of the time and to subsequent memory, did not
unite New Zealanders: it divided them.” (p.13) In Chapter 5 and the
following chapter, he is determined to “prove” it. He presents all the
privations of war (rationing, blackouts, digging air-raid shelters) as
intolerable impositions, and he plays up the many complaints that New
Zealanders made. I would interpret this as the functioning of a healthy, open
democracy, which still had much room for free speech despite censorship; but
Eldred-Grigg interprets it as signs of incipient class warfare. As for the
“invasion” of American troops, Eldred-Grigg
focuses on disorder, sexual misconduct, the “Battle of Manners Street”
and other brawls between Kiwis and Americans, having decided that any evidence
of more affable relationships between allies is not worth reporting.
Comes
Chapter 5, dealing with the last two years of the war, (January 1943 to
September 1945) and Eldred-Grigg claims this was another “phoney war” as it was
by now only a matter of time before the Axis powers were defeated. New
Zealand civilians were only playing at
supporting the war. There was much discontent. This time, he concentrates on
the reluctance of most soldiers to return to active service after they had been
given three months furlough at home; and the limited ways in which the
government made use of women in the workforce.
Finally,
in his summing-up (Chapter 6), Eldred-Grigg basically damns the Allies for
using nuclear weapons to end the war; says the outcome of the war was simply to
create the Cold War between the USA and USSR; damns Britain and France and the
Netherlands – now assisted by the USA – for trying to hang on to their colonial
empires when they had said they were fighting for democracy; and again asserts
that New Zealand would have better remained neutral.
As
I was at pains to say in my opening paragraphs, there is much factual and
documentary detail in this book, but there is also no doubt that it is very
partial information and suborned to the purposes of polemic.
I
will simply walk through a number of examples of Eldred-Grigg’s very loaded arguments. Consider this
suggestion: “New Zealand could have
followed the example of Ireland and proclaimed neutrality. A neutral policy
would have had strong advantages. The country would have been saved from much
of the waste, misery and loss of war. Also the policy could have been changed
when the tides of war went one way or the other, making neutrality a more or
less prudent course to steer.” (p.66) There is little point in comparing
New Zealand with Ireland in this matter. In 1939, fewer than 20 years had
passed since British troops were engaged in trying to put down Ireland’s fight
for independence. The mood and disposition of the Irish people were very
different from the mood and disposition of New Zealanders – even New Zealanders
of Irish descent, despite Eldred-Grigg’s claims to the contrary. (Incidentally,
Eldred-Grigg frequently errs by referring to Ireland as a “republic” in the
Second World War. Although it asserted its independence in a new constitution
of 1937, it did not officially style itself a Republic until 1949.)
Then
there are many lapses into improbable
speculation. Eldred-Grigg says New Zealand’s Labour government was partly
coerced into declaring war by fear of a conservative backlash. He claims: “The Labour government, by choosing
neutrality, would have had to work hard to cope with protests and
lobbying by conservatives within New Zealand. The National Party might
perhaps have sponsored a political coup, backed openly by the
governor-general and secretly by London. Motor cavalcades might have
rumbled through city streets bearing troops – young middle-class men willing to
do the job of putting down the working class as their fathers or grandfathers
had done so thoroughly in the days of ‘Massey’s Cossacks’ ”. (p.66) The
“would have” and “might haves” in the above statement mark this as speculative
fantasy.
As
in much polemic concerning the (Western European and American) Allies, there is
much tacit whitewashing of the role of
the Soviet Union. From Winston Churchill down, nobody has ever doubted that
the bulk of Hitler’s armies were destroyed on the Eastern Front in battles that
carried off more millions of Soviet lives than the combined death rolls of all
other Allies combined. But this doesn’t excuse such statements (with regard to
the initial invasion of Poland) as “Moscow…
stood aside after signing a non-aggression pact with Berlin.” (p.61) Not
true. In accordance with the pact (really an alliance, since Uncle Joe
continued to supply Adolf with war material for the next two years), Germany
and Russia divided Poland between them and held joint victory parades. Later, when
he gets to Operation Barbarossa (p.156), Eldred-Grigg manages to say nothing
about the enfeeblement of the Red Army due to Stalin’s massive purges, and
hence the initial catastrophic defeats the Soviets suffered. With regard to New
Zealand, there is little mention of the CPNZ’s sudden conversion from being
anti-war, and seeing the war as a mere tussle between “bourgeois democracies”, to
being a militantly pro-war party once the USSR was attacked.
When
he is busy belittling the idea that, at the declaration of war in 1939,
democracies were pitted against the Nazi dictatorship, Eldred-Grigg remarks: “A … glaring weakness in the theory was that
the target was only one dictatorship. One-party police states were thick on the
ground in Europe. Why was war not declared on Portugal or Latvia or Hungary?”
(p.74) But this is not a rhetorical question, even if the author thinks it is.
Portugal, Latvia and Hungary (which did later join the Axis) were not, in 1939,
following an aggressive expansionist war policy. Germany was.
Eldred-Grigg
notes that the New Zealand press played up the courage and resilience of
Londoners under the Blitz. He then goes on: “Nobody
told the households of the dominion that German civilians were also coping
pluckily. Air raids after several months were killing far more civilians in
Germany than in Britain, yet the news media in the dominion stayed eerily
silent about their suffering.” (p.122) Later he reminds us that by the end
of the war, for every one British citizen killed in German air raids, 12 German
civilians were killed in Allied air raids. (p.232) I do not doubt his
statistics here and, at this distance from the Second World War, it is
perfectly right to account carefully for all civilian deaths. Nevertheless,
Eldred-Grigg is himself “eerily silent”
about such matters as Nazi behaviour towards civilian populations in the
countries they occupied. Like his presentation of Germany as a peaceful,
progressive nation in The Great Wrong War,
this is a case of over-compensation for
the received Hollywood image of a clear-cut morally-uncomplicated war.
On
a number of occasions, I find Eldred-Grigg indulging in the easy retrospective
game of being wise-after-the-event.
Take the following glib summing up of the wartime situation in New Zealand: “Austerity clothing and rationing helped
spread thinning resources more fairly, but in many ways the government was
sabotaging the economy. Digging air-raid shelters was a waste of scarce labour;
so was ‘directing’ workers into ‘essential’ industry, driving citizens away
from their workaday tasks into the Emergency Precautions Scheme and drilling
men in the Home Guard. Blackouts hindered production and trade. Rationing and
manpowering caused economic inefficiency. The costs of ‘total war’ were heavy.
The costs were unnecessary, too, because the enemy was not on its way.”
(pp.205-206)
The
last sentence here takes no account of what were reasonable fears and
precautions at the time. Over eighty years later, it is easy for us to
make generalisations about an enemy power’s strengths and intentions because we
have many years of researched and documented sources behind us. But these were unavailable
at the time. A tone of smugness creeps in when inverted commas are placed
around the word “essential”, as if we would be more acute at judging what were
and were not essential things in the same circumstances.
Then
there is this fatuous advice given to ghosts: “New Zealand should have been doing its best to diversify from rather
than to back up its trade with Britain. Alternative markets were not easy to
find, admittedly, but neither the government nor exporters did a lot to look for
those markets, even though they saw that waging war was wrecking the British
economy… Imperial loyalty led many people to say that the dominion should stick
with Britain in spite of its new poverty. Other allies, though, were seeking
their own advantage. Why not New Zealand?” (p.334) Note the throwaway
clause “alternative markets were not easy
to find, admittedly.” (And if that
were so, how much more difficult would they be to find in the middle of a war?)
Note also the implicit cynicism – this country is getting battered so, for our
own advantage only, let’s look for another to trade with.
Speaking of cynicism, note the unsubtle tranference of
guilt in the following statement: “Killing,
sickening or maiming the workforce is an odd way to safeguard an economy,
yet that was what happened when the dominion declared war on the Axis. A total
of 12,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen died during the fighting. New Zealand
killed a higher percentage of its troops than any other country in the
British Commonwealth. Patriots took pride in that death rate, thinking it
evidence of bravery, but the tally might instead be seen as proof that the
policy of going to war had gone badly wrong.” (p.338) Yes, folks, that
devious Labour government of Michael Joseph Savage and Peter Fraser
deliberately lined up 12,000 New Zealand soldiers, sailors and airmen and shot
them. The deaths were entirely their fault.
In a famous critique of the way Edward Gibbon dealt
dismissively with Christian martyrs in his Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire, Cardinal John Henry Newman said “You cannot argue with a sneer.” His
point was a good one. Even when the facts of a history book are verifiable, it
is the author’s tone of voice that conveys much of a book’s meaning.
Eldred-Grigg’s (very selective use of) facts and contemporary documents is
often informative, but equally often the tone of voice is pure sneer.
I
am no particular admirer of British monarchy, and would be quite happy if New
Zealand were a republic, but I know Eldred-Grigg is deep into sneer mode when
he refers to Edward VIII only as “Edward
Windsor, figurehead king of New Zealand”
(p.48) or when he sniffs “American claims
to democracy – loud to the point of braying – were in some ways hollow.”
(p.52) Then there is his habit of minimising the importance of any military
campaign in which New Zealanders were involved, as in “The key war, for the [Japanese] governing
groups, was the war in Asia. The ‘Pacific War’, as the Americans called it, was
always a sideshow for Tokyo.” (p.216)
The North African and Italian
campaigns are also referred to as “sideshows”. We are agreed that by far the
greatest pummelling the Wehrmacht took was administered by the Red Army. Even
so, one would have to be very ignorant indeed of the strategy of the Second
World War not to understand why the Pacific War, North Africa and Italy were
important.
“All military effort by the dominion was more
or less meaningless,” pontificates Eldred-Grigg “… the Axis would have lost the war anyway, whatever the dominion did
or did not do.” (pp.363-364) Such a statement begs more questions than I
could number. Like Stevan Eldred-Grigg, I was born long after the Second World
War, and I have no desire to sound like some boozy old RSA member, exaggerating
his wartime feats. But in this sort of statement, Eldred-Grigg knows he is
waving a red rag at many old bulls. Is it in moments like this that he is
bidding for immortality and hoping that a barrage of angry rejoinders will
allow his publishers to say that this unbalanced book is “controversial”?
You
have now heard enough of this sort of thing from me, so I will refrain from
deconstructing Eldred-Grigg’s use of the word “phoney” in both his title and in
two chapter headings. But as Eldred-Grigg indulges in counter-factual history
(i.e. speculating “what if?”) in his closing chapter, I think I should be
allowed to do the same.
Eldred-Grigg
asks why New Zealand couldn’t have had a “Holyoakean” reaction to the outbreak
of the Second World War. He means, why couldn’t Savage and Fraser have reacted
the way Keith Holyoake did to the Vietnam War? Faced with the demands of a
powerful ally (the USA) for New Zealand to get involved in Vietnam, Holyoake managed
cleverly to ingratiate himself with the ally while sending only a very small
volunteer force overseas and never contemplating conscription. Ignoring the
fact that the circumstances of the two wars were very different, and that
public opinion in New Zealand had moved on and was very different in the 1960s
from what it had been in the 1940s, Eldred-Grigg thinks he has a point to make.
Eldred-Grigg
belittles the Atlantic Charter in which Roosevelt and Churchill declared their
war aims to be the promotion of peace and democracy. Says Eldred-Grigg: “While many – perhaps even most – citizens
thought the charter noble, it was only words.” (p.167) He then goes on to
condemn the duplicity of Britain, France and others for attempting to hold on
to colonial empires by force once the Second World War was over. Britain disposed
of India promptly, but fought in Kenya and Malaya. France fought losing wars in
Algeria and Indo-China. Both were involved in the foolish 1956 adventure in
Egypt. The Dutch tried, and failed, to hold on to the “Dutch East Indies”
(Indonesia). So Eldred-Grigg’s point is valid, right?
Not
really. He has stopped his historical clock too soon. In fewer than 20 years
after the Second World War, mass opinion in the West had turned against the
idea of holding on to colonial empires; and governments were no longer using
the rhetoric of empire that they had still used in the 1940s.
Okay,
so here’s my counter-factual.
Let’s
say that statements like the Atlantic Charter were never made. Let’s say that
(like their enemies) these two allies had spurned support for democracy. How
much would public opinion not have been stirred, in later years, to move away
from support for imperialism? This is at least as good a “what if?” as
Eldred-Grigg’s. By which I mean it’s at least as bad a one.