We feature each fortnight Nicholas Reid's reviews and comments on new and recent books.
“A SMALL
TOWN IN UKRAINE” by Bernard Wasserstein (Penguin-Random House, $NZ40); “THE
RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR” by Serhii Plokhy (Penguin- Random House, $NZ 40); “AFTERMATHS
– Colonialism, Violence and Memory in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific” edited by Angela Wanhalla,
Lyndall Ryan and Camille Nurka (Otago University Press $NZ50)
Bernard
Wasserstein’s A Small Town in Ukraine is a work of both deep historical
research and personal memory as passed down by his father. The small town in
question is Krakoviec [he tells us it is pronounced Krah-KOV-yets], now in
Ukraine on the border with Poland. But it wasn’t always so. Once upon a time,
the population of Krakoviec was dominantly Jewish, a shtetl occupied by
Ashkenazi Jews, but as Wasserstein warns us, the shtetl has often been “the
object of much mythologising, nostalgia and sentimentality” (p.41) when
life there was often stressful. It wasn’t like day-long happy singing and
dancing as in the film Fiddler on the Roof.
Wasserstein begins with an account of his grandfather Berl Wasserstein
who was happily attuned to the life he was living in the Berlin of Weimar
Germany. But by 1938, with the Nazis now tightening laws against Jews and brutally expelling them, Berl returned to his
origins in Krakoviec. We know what will
come – the Holocaust that spread through Poland, Ukraine and the western
reaches of Russia – and this will destroy Berl Wasserstein, though his son (the
author’s father) is able to escape.
Here, however, Bernard Wasserstein turns to chapters (taking up about
half the book) surveying the whole history of central Eastern Europe. It is a
very complex history. Nations are made and destroyed over centuries in wars and
invasions by Poles, Germans, Austrians, Tatars, Cossacks and Russians. Names of
regions change (Ruthenia? Galicia?). By the 18th century, many Poles
have moved into the region and Polish aristocrats are controlling much of what
is now called Ukraine. The local Polish lord is relatively benign to the Jewish
community in little Krakoviec, but by
the middle of the 19th century the Austro-Hungarian Empire claims
much of the Territory. This is basically good news for the Jews of Krakoviec as
the Austrian Emperor Franz-Joseph is very protective of the Jews and is admired
by the Jewish people. In Krakoviec there is a handsome synagogue, but there are
growing numbers of gentiles, and there are also Roman Catholic and Russian
Catholic churches. (“Russian Catholic” Christians accept the pope as head of
their church, but worship in eastern rights. They are not to be confused with
the Russian Orthodox church, and they are sometimes called “Uniates”, a term
which they find insulting, though Wasserstein
seems unaware of this.) And it is now, in the mid-19th century, that
“Ruthenians” discard the term, revert to the ancient name Ukrainian, and begin
a long nationalist campaign to expel the Poles. So to much nationalist violence
both ways.
In the First World
War, Russian and Austrian armies rolled this way and that through the
territory, with the Russians often committing pogroms. The Poles were fighting
for an autonomous nation (Poland had been carved up between Russia, Germany and
Austria). The Ukrainians were fighting for independence – and they often saw
Jews as unreliable. It was in this period that Ukrainian and Polish groups
turned to terrorism as they fought each other. [It is interesting to note that
Wasserstein barely mentions the Holodomir – the man-made famine ordered by Stalin in the
1930s which caused the death of about four million Ukrainians – but then he is
focusing on events around his forebears’ village and its area.]
And so at last we
move to Krakoviec as it was when Berl
Wasserstein was there again. He and his family spoke the Jewish dialect of
German, Yiddish, at that time the language most widely used by Jews. With the
threat of Nazism, Jews were now trying to flee far from Europe, especially as
Poland was also expelling Jews even before the German invasion of Poland. Then
Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia made their pact and jointly invaded Poland.
Hitler’s armies set about exterminating Jews. Stalin’s army set about
destroying all Polish leadership and culture. The Russians took over the
eastern part of Ukraine. In a bogus plebiscite, Russia incorporated Ukraine
into the Soviet Union. Soviet atheism meant all synagogues and churches were
closed down or turned into factories. Soviet control also included the
“resettlement” and killing of Ukrainians in their thousands. It was the
commissar Khrushchev who was in charge of this, belying the much-later image he
had as a relatively reasonable head of the Soviet Union. The Nazis pushed on into Ukraine, killing
Jews as well as Poles en masse. By now, in their hunger to be rid of
Poles, many Ukrainians joined the Nazi SS, rounding up Jews for extermination
and ambushing and murdering Poles.
By the time, in the latter stages of the war, that the USSR took over all
of Ukraine, there was, as far as Bernard Wasserstein can ascertain, a grand
total of one Jew living in Krakoviec. For a while, Berl Wasserstein and his
family had been able to hide under the protection of a Ukrainian, but
eventually their “protector” betrayed them to the SS and they were sent to a
death camp. But one member of the family escaped, Addi Wasserstein, the
author’s father. By various – often dangerous – means, Addi was able to escape
to Italy and then managed to get all the way to Palestine, where he stayed
until the end of the war, and then emigrated to the United States.
Bernard Wasserstein does not end his story with this great escape. He is
intensely interested in what became of Krakoviec in later years. Even after the
war and under Soviet control, there was still two-way “ethnic cleansing”
between Ukrainians and Poles and intermittent terrorism. Eventually the
Ukrainians ground down and expelled the Poles. Krakoviec became a Soviet-ruled
outpost. Wasserstein remarks “The population dwindled to barely a thousand.
The Jews had been murdered, the Poles expelled. What had for several centuries
been a multi-ethnic community was now almost entirely Ukrainian.” (p.204)
Wasserstein and his brother visited Krakoviec twice – in 1996 and 2019
after Russia had withdrawn and Ukraine was now fully independent. These were
journeys of filial piety as much as of curiosity. Wasserstein was observing a
sad and run-down little town, but he was also looking for traces of buildings
associated with his forebears. They were hard to trace. They did find a
memorial to the Jews who had been transported and murdered – also noticing that
somebody had scratched a swastika on it.
Wasserstein was startled to see that the Ukrainian “patriot” Roman
Shukhevych was honoured with a huge monument and his image still appears on
Ukrainian postage stamps as a founder of the modern state of Ukraine.
Wasserstein points out that Roman Shukhevych was an ardent “ethnic-cleanser”
who hunted down and killed Jews and Poles under the direction of the SS. As you
are probably aware, over 75 years since the end of the Second World War,
Vladimir Putin uses such information to suggest the Ukraine is a “fascist”
state and he is liberating it. In fact, early in Putin’s attempted invasion of
Ukraine, you may have seen images of Russian soldiers “discovering” (i.e.
planting) fascist propaganda in Ukrainian bunkers. In spite of all the horror,
Wasserstein ends on a positive note. After centuries of Ukrainians and Poles
being at logger-heads, Poland is now scrupulously supporting the Ukrainians in
their struggle.
*. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *. *
With Serhii Plokhy’s The Russo-Ukrainian War we get a different
perspective on Ukraine. This is not a personal memoir, but an astute historian
and journalist’s account of a war and its origins. Serhii Plokhy wrote his book
between March 2022, when the attempted Russian invasion began, and completed
writing it in February 2023. Inasmuch as a book can be up-to-date and topical, The
Russo-Ukrainian War is as up to date as it could be, although obviously the
most recent events cannot be included. By the time you read this, the situation
could have changed radically.
What Plokhy does in his first two lengthy chapters is to examine the
whole history of Russia’s relationship with Ukraine. Deeply imbedded in Russian
mythology is the notion that “White Russia” (Belarus) and “Little Russia”
(Ukraine) are just extensions of Russia and therefore, by right, should be
absorbed into Russia itself. Digging back to the Middle Ages, Russian
chauvinists claim Ukraine’s capital Kiev (Kyve) was the first centre of Russian
culture and identity, and therefore should belong to Russia. Much of this claim
is based on the fact that for some centuries Russia ruled Ukraine. But despite Russian
claims, and even allowing for the fact that a minority of Ukrainians speak
Russian, the great majority of Ukrainians speak their own language and do not
regard themselves as Russian. Through centuries, Ukrainians repeatedly rebelled
against Russian rule and they are still aware of the Holodomir – Stalinist Russia’s
planned famines in the 1930s which killed about 4 million Ukrainians.
Ukrainians are a nation apart. For Russia to claim Ukraine again would be like
Britain reclaiming India, or France reclaiming Algeria… I mean, they both ruled
those countries once, didn’t they?
Plokhy explains how, after the disintegration of the USSR, Russia’s fragile democracy failed. Boris Yeltsin
tried to tidy up Russia’s constitution, but in doing so he paved the way for
autocracy. Enter Vladimir Putin, who has in effect made himself permanent autocrat.
Putin is angry that in the disintegration of the USSR, Russia lost so much
territory when Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic States voted for independence. Even
in the Crimea, which had a Russian-speaking majority, the vote was for
independence from Russia. When Putin invaded and took over Crimea in 2014, he
hastily arranged a rigged referendum to claim the majority of Crimeans wanted
to re-join Russia. It is interesting to note, as Plokhy does, that Vladimir
Putin, the former KGB man, frequently curses Lenin for having set up a system
in which Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic states could be regarded as fellow Socialist
Republics and run their own internal affairs under Soviet surveillance. Says
Plokhy, among Putin’s favourite reading are the works of the “White Guard”
general Anton Denikin, who fought against the Bolsheviks in the Russian civil
war but who advocated for a “unified” Russia (including Ukraine, Belarus etc.) ruled
directly from Moscow. What I take from all this is that through the centuries,
and up to Putin, the essential ideology of Russia has been autocratic imperialism.
Whether Tsarism, Communism or Putin, the autocratic Russian ideal is dominance
of adjoining East Central Europe and adjoining Asian states. [BTW, as Plokhy
notes, it is a sad fact that Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a brave critic of the
Soviet regime, cuddled up to Putin in his last years and embraced the
expansionist Russian ideology.]
Now all this is the setting for Plokhy’s account of the current war in
Ukraine, but I think it is the most crucial part in understanding why the war
is taking place. When the Cold War ended, Eastern European countries that had
had Communist governments imposed upon them now rushed to join western
protection. In 1993 Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the (adjoining
Russia) Baltic states joined NATO. Later Finland (next to Russia) and Sweden
(abandoning its neutral status) also joined NATO. This was a nightmare to a
Russian autocrat. As Plokhy remarks “Vladimir Putin thought about Russian
security in the same way as the tsars and commissars did: to make Russia safe
they created and maintained a belt of buffer states. Putin wanted to bring most
of the former Soviet republics under the leadership of Moscow…” (p.91) Yet
here were neighbouring states that were no longer buffers.
So to Plokhy’s account of the ongoing war. Having invaded Georgia and
attached it to Russia, Putin showed that he would use force in rebuilding the
Russian empire. Then there was the campaign to corrupt the Ukrainian government
by bribery and threat. Putin supported the corrupt Ukrainian premier Yanukovych
who toed Putin’s line. Yanukovych fled the country (with a pile of money) when
he was overthrown by Ukraine’s popular Orange Revolution and democracy was
restored. At which point Putin invaded Crimea. Volodymry Zelensky - a Jew who
had grown up speaking Russian but who diligently learnt the Ukrainian language –
became president of Ukraine. Zelensky shut down Putin-funded stations which
peddled Putin’s propaganda and promoted violence against the Ukrainian
government.
In February 2022, Putin unleashed what he called a “special military
operation”. He concentrated at first on taking over and “liberating” the Donbas
regions, where Russian-speakers were the majority. In this attack, he had some
local support. But it was clear that Putin’s real intention was an all-out
invasion of Ukraine, which was shown when Russian forces began rocket and drone
attacks against Ukraine’s capital Kyve, far from the disputed Donbas. Russian tanks
lined up, assuming they would soon be entering the Kyve. But they were
repulsed. And this is where we come to the Achilles heel of Putin’s plans.
Putin believed his own propaganda, and told his Russian audience that
Ukrainians would welcome his forces with open arms as liberators. Quite the
opposite was the case. Ukrainians rallied behind Zelensky and the Ukrainian armed
forces proved to be more formidable than Putin expected. Please note that, at
the time I am writing this review, Putin’s “special military operation” has
gone on for fifteen months, with some indications that the Russian army has
bogged down. But I am not so naïve as to imagine that this will be the final
judgement on Putin’s attempted invasion.
In his later chapters Plokhy diligently chronicles the war and its
consequences – the massive movement of refugees; the to-and-fro of Ukrainian and
Russian forces taking or being driven out of certain areas; the Ukrainian
forces re-capturing areas in the Donbas; the fact that Russian bombing of the
Donbas region killed more Russian-speakers than Ukrainians; the Russian failure
to capture the port of Odessa and the Ukrainians joy in sinking a Russian
warship (embarrassed by the event, Russian media claimed the ship had sunk in a
storm) ; the process by which (West) European countries imposed sanctions on
Russia – the USA and the UK were the first to send help to Ukraine - France, Italy
and Germany finally got on board, but they were a little reluctant as they
depended so much on Russian gas. Which relates to the way prices for oil and
gas affected the economies of much of the world. Framing Putin’s war as a rogue
event, Plokhy sees the “special military operation” as encouraging China to
take a more aggressive attitude to Taiwan. In his closing chapter he also
opines that, where once Russia was the more dominant force [during the Cold
War] totalitarian China has now surpassed it, with a healthier economy, a more
advanced infrastructure, more industrial activity and much stronger military
forces. In Asia, Russia is now the junior partner.
In writing this review, I am fully aware that The Russo-Ukrainian War was
written by a Ukrainian and therefore that it will have some patriotic biases.
But I do not believe a minor bias distorts either the author’s historical perspective,
or his reportage on the war.
*. *. *.
*. *. *. *. *.
*. *. *.
*. *. *.
*. *. *.
*.
One
of the most difficult tasks a reviewer faces is giving a balanced account of a
collection of essays. There will be so many different perspectives presented
that the reviewer has to make broad generalisations, often missing the
particular nuance of each contributor’s work. But Aftermaths, subtitled Colonialism, Violence and Memory in Australia, New Zealand and
the Pacific sets out its agenda very clearly in its Introduction.
There, two of the editors, Angela Wanhalla and Lyndall Ryan, tell us that
colonialism is an ongoing, living process and not merely an event in the past;
that violence and warfare were often the minor part of colonisation, being
supplemented by the confiscation of land and suppression of indigenous customs
and beliefs; that the descendants of colonisers often suffer from historical
amnesia, either not knowing or choosing not to know the violent things their
ancestors did in creating their colony; and that attempts at “assimilation”
were not always benign. Put simply then, the 21 essays collected here are an indictment
of colonialism. Women are dominant in this indictment – to be precise, of the
24 contributors, only three are male. Note also that some Australian
contributors are happy to use the term “Aborigine” while others shun it. I am
not sure of the current status of this term.
The collection is
divided into five sections, which I summarise thus:
Part One: Violence
perpetrated by colonialists: Joanna Kidman and Vincent O’Malley use the
story of the massacre at Orakau pa in 1864 as an example of history being
cleaned up to sooth pakeha sensibilities. Amanda Nettlebeck shows how long it
has taken Australians to accept that the indigenous people were defending their
lands when colonisers massacred them – and only now are some public memorials
acknowledging this fact. Keri Mills calls for many Pakeha to accept that their
ancestors benefitted from land confiscated from Maori. A rather strange, and very
ambiguous, contribution by Anaru Eketone questions whether a Methodist
missionary was a martyr killed by Maori as his co-religionists thought… but in
the end she has to admit that, whatever the status of the missionary, real
violence was involved.
Part Two: Violence
specifically against indigenous women: Victoria Haskins deals with the
massacre of the Wilot people in California in 1860, and how a dress, used in
coming-of-age ceremonies, was confiscated… only to be returned well over a
century later so that it is once again an icon to this people. Kate Stevens
discusses how, in colonial Fiji, young indigenous girls were often stigmatised
by the law as provocateurs in rape cases. Lyndall Ryan considers the specific
case of a “code of silence” among frontier Australians which prevented
prosecution of those who murdered a young Aboriginal girl. One anomaly here is
Angela Wanhalla’s beautifully crafted
account of a former slave woman, from the West Indies, who married a British
soldier, and they apparently lived in harmony… but of course such pairing was
extremely rare.
Part Three: Direct
physical and sexual abuse of indigenous people: Shino Konishi relates
the harsh ways in which the explorer Eyre treated his indigenous “boys” and
trackers. Stephanie Gilbert speaks of sexual and other abuses that took place
in “homes” for Aboriginal girls (part of the “stolen generation”) – and further
discusses how, in recent enquiries, such victims often have to relive trauma
repeatedly in giving their testimonies. As told by Erica Newman, orphanages in
colonial Fiji were quite different – indigenous Fijians were never separated
from their families or placed in residential care; but the children of
indentured Indians were, being thus deprived of much of their Indian identity.
Part Four: Early
critiques of colonialism: Jane Lydon chronicles early, but feeble,
attempts in 1880s Western Australia to rein in pastoralists who exploited
Aboriginals almost as if they were slaves. Lachy Paterson discusses a short-lived
Maori newspaper in the 1860s which defended the Kingitanga by comparing its
assertion of autonomy with the Haiti revolution.
Part Five:
Recent artistic responses to colonialism: Rachel Burgess gives an account of the Aboriginal artist Rover Thomas’s
non-representational paintings referring to a massacre in 1924. Anna Johnston
deals with Judy Watson’s mapping and naming all sites in which Aborigines were
killed by pastoralists, making them known to all Australians who had ignored or
not known these things. Tony Ballantyne balances the statue of James Cook in
Gisborne with the more recent monument to Te Maro, a leader who was killed by
Cook’s crew. And Penelope Edmonds records how a statue of John Batman,
sometimes called the “founder” of Melbourne, was put on trial recently by
Aborigine activists, who pointed out that Batman was one of those who attempted
to exterminate all Aborigines in the state.
If you have had
the good fortune to have a copy of Aftermaths at hand, you may notice
that I have left out four of the essays.
One I regard as
exceptional, because it is the only essay to dwell on the impact of
colonisation upon indigenous flora. This is Grace Moore’s exceptional account
of Louisa Atkinson, an early Australian conservationist who repeatedly warned
that chopping down indigenous trees to create farmland would eventually cause
ecological disaster. Regrettably, she was right.
The other three I
find a little overblown. Patricia O’Brien illustrates the sexual abuse of
indigenous women by talking about the Australian film-star Errol Flynn, whose
forebears were “blackbirders” (kidnappers of indigenous people to exploit in
plantations) and who himself sexually exploited indigenous women in New Guinea
before he went off to exploit underage girls in Hollywood. Kirsten Moffat gives
a rather laboured account of a satire that was written against those who
invaded Parihaka. And, similarly, Caitlin Lynch and Sian Smith pick apart
Rudall Hayward’s 1940 film Rewi’s Last Stand, faulting it (easily) as a
sugar-coated version of what really happened. I am not implying that these
three essays are historically inaccurate, but they do come close to being
frivolous in comparison with the more weighty issues dealt with in most of this
collection.